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Abstract 
Although the ecological tradition tends to favour a substantive role for non-market 
institutions in securing objectives such as environmental sustainability, Green theorists have 
paid relatively little attention to the important challenge posed to such proposals by the pro-
market arguments of Austrian Economics. The methods of Ecological Economics, such as 
multiple criteria evaluation, offer important potential for responding to the Austrian thesis 
that democratic, non-market institutions face a coordination problem in the face of 
complexity. However, the development of an adequate ecological response to the Austrians 
requires clarification of the conceptual underpinnings and potential scope of such methods. 
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1. Introduction 
The central question of political economy concerning the relative merits of market and non-
market institutions has inevitably arisen for Green political theorists, whose recognition of 
the scale of current problems of ecological degradation is increasingly shaping this long-
standing debate. Meadowcroft argues that if there is one lesson to be learned from the debate 
during the 20th Century it is that markets and planning are not mutually exclusive options. 
Rather, the question should be that of how best to combine them (Meadowcroft 1999: 37). 
This is a point emphasised by the ‘Green paradigm’ in political thought, which advocates that 
markets need to operate within the context of a thick layer of democratic political institutions 
for establishing objectives such as environmental sustainability (Greenwood 2007a). Writers 
who fall within the Green paradigm include, to name just three, Herman Daly, Michael 
Jacobs and John Barry. 
While the Green paradigm and the school of Ecological Economics with which it is 
associated have a close interest in the institutional questions of political economy, they pay 
relatively little attention to the important critique of non-market planning developed by the 
Austrian Economists Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich A. Hayek. The ecological tradition, as 
numerous articles in this journal demonstrate, offers an extensive critique of cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA) techniquesi. In seeking to assign monetary prices to ecological services, CBA 
is criticised for adopting the assumption of Neoclassical Economics that such values can 
invariably be fully captured in monetary terms. However, it is Austrian, not neoclassical, 
economics that offers an explicitly pro-market approach (Mulberg 1992; Pennington 2001; 
2003). The Austrians argue that markets are an indispensable means of achieving social 
coordination, given the epistemological limitations of economic actors, the dispersion of 
knowledge across society and the significance of change and uncertainty. While the Green 
paradigm provides strong normative grounds for contesting the conclusions of Austrian-
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influenced ‘free market environmentalism’, the Austrian coordination argument nevertheless 
poses a significant challenge to Green political economy. This paper explores how Austrian 
theoretical insights offer a challenge which can spur the further development of an ecological 
response. 
There are some important similarities between the philosophical conceptions of 
economic choice that underpin the Austrian and ecological schools, as explained in section 2. 
It is their contrasting normative commitments that lead them to differ markedly in terms of 
the kinds of political and economic institutions they propose. Section 3 outlines the challenge 
that the Austrians’ case for markets poses for Green proposals to expand the scope of non-
market institutions. Research in Ecological Economics has much to offer in response to this 
Austrian challenge and section 4 assesses the potential offered by an important set of 
techniques known as multiple criteria analysis (MCA). Drawing from the insights of Austrian 
theory, clarification of the meaning and scope of concepts such as ‘compensability’, 
‘commensurability’ and ‘trade-offs’ in different MCA methods is offered. This is a necessary 
first stage in the development of an ecological response to the Austrians, meant to encourage 
further exploration of important questions concerning the scope for non-market institutions to 
achieve coordination. 
 
2. Philosophical Underpinnings of Ecological and Austrian Economics 
The Austrian tradition in economics has a number of distinguishing features that represent a 
marked departure from the neoclassical school. Emphasis is placed upon the importance of 
the concept of time in economic analysis, the radical uncertainty facing economic actors 
(O’Driscoll and Rizzo 1985) and the need to understand the process through which economic 
change occurs, not just the formal analysis of economic outcomes (Kirzner 1992). Austrian 
theory has been applied to a number of areas in economics, including capital theory (e.g. 
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Lachmann 1956) and understanding technological changeii. It is from this Austrian tradition 
that a radically pro-market position emerges in the work of Mises and Hayek. 
Austrian theory shares with Ecological Economics a recognition that economic 
decisions require consideration of a plurality of values that are often ‘incommensurable’ 
(Munda 1997). Previous contributions to this journal have taken incommensurability to mean 
that values cannot be precisely measured along a common cardinal scale using a single metric 
unit of value (Beckerman and Pasek 1997; Aldred 2002; Fleisher Trainor 2006).iii However, 
this recognition of the incommensurability of values does not necessarily entail a critique of 
markets. Mises’ case for markets starts from an acknowledgement of the existence of ‘non-
economic’ values, such as the natural beauty of a waterfall and the honour of a nation that 
cannot be expressed in monetary terms (Mises 1936: 116). Such values, that are not captured 
by market exchange values, are referred to henceforward as ‘excluded’ values. Mises makes 
clear that market prices can only ever imperfectly and incompletely capture the full range of 
values (Greenwood 2006). The argument developed by the Austrians is that markets are 
nevertheless an indispensable means of facilitating coordination in the face of the complex 
plurality of variables that economic decisions involve. 
Mises and Hayek identify two closely inter-related, indispensable functions of 
markets, those of knowledge encapsulation and discovery (Lavoie 1990; Greenwood 2007b). 
The former is implicitly present in Mises’ critique of the non-market socialism proposed by 
his socialist contemporary, Otto Neurath.iv For Neurath, economic decisions require 
consideration of a plurality of qualitatively distinct, incommensurable values, ranging from 
material living standards to leisure time and environmental quality. From this premise of 
incommensurability, Neurath infers that monetary prices serve no useful function in rational 
decision-making. Economic calculation should instead be conducted ‘in kind’, with each 
qualitatively distinct type of good being measured in terms of the appropriate physical unit, 
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whether it be a quantitative measurement such as weight, length, volume, time etc, or a 
qualitative description (Uebel and Cohen 2004). Mises’ response accepts Neurath’s premise 
concerning the qualitative heterogeneity of values. Mises refers to these values in terms of 
utility only in a purely nominal sense (Mises 1949: 21). He rejects the notion that utility can 
be defined in phenomenological terms and is cardinally measurable (ibid: 15). Mises directs 
his critique towards Neurath’s inference from the premise of incommensurability that 
monetary prices serve no useful function. Although prices emerge from market participants’ 
economic choices involving multiple, incommensurable values, they indicate the relative 
levels of demand and supply in terms of a single commensurable unit. In modern society, 
with its complex array of products and resources, each with many alternative uses, such a unit 
of measurement is, holds Mises, indispensable in enabling economic actors to compare the 
complex, ever changing range of economic alternatives. 
This Misesean thesis is further developed by Hayek, whose case for markets has a 
strong epistemological emphasis (Lavoie 1985; Kirzner 1992). Hayek frequently re-
emphasises the Misesean premise of value incommensurability (e.g. Hayek 1976: 76, 108). 
He stresses that producers’ and consumers’ needs and preferences are often particular to a 
certain time and place. As a result, economic knowledge is necessarily dispersed across 
society. The market mechanism is the best way not only of encapsulating this knowledge 
through the price mechanism (Hayek 1935: 85) but facilitating knowledge discovery (Hayek 
1968). Identification of this second function of markets challenges the neoclassical 
assumption that the ends of individuals can be identified independently of the market process. 
The market, it is emphasised, enables economic actors to discover their ends through the 
process of seeking and assessing the various means of achieving them. This argument was 
originally directed by the Austrians towards socialist models of non-market pricing. 
However, CBA also involves non-market institutions seeking to acquire knowledge of what 
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the value of environmental goods would be if they were traded and is thus similarly 
vulnerable to this Austrian objection (Mulberg 1992; Pennington 2003). 
Neoclassical and Ecological Economics can easily be distinguished. The former 
assumes that excluded values can be fully captured by a monetary unit of measurement, while 
the latter rejects this claim (O’Neill and Spash 2000). However, no such straightforward 
distinction can be made between the assumptions of Austrian theory and Ecological 
Economics, for both accept that certain values are incommensurable. The source of the 
different institutional proposals of the two schools is not to be found in their assumptions 
concerning the comparability of values. The notion of ‘weak comparability,’ that has been 
proposed as the defining premise for Ecological Economics (Martinez-Alier et al 1998), is 
also quite consistent with the assumptions of Austrian theory. The assumption of the weak 
comparability of values is distinguished by O’Neill (1993; 1997) from strong comparability. 
Strong comparability does not assume a cardinal measure of value but does mean that there 
exists “a single comparative term in terms of which (alternatives) can be ordered” (O’Neill 
1993: 104). O’Neill challenges the assumption of the strong comparability of values, arguing 
that there can be no such single comparative term. The concept of value, he suggests, is 
‘attributive’, meaning that when describing one alternative as more valuable than another, the 
criterion in terms of which it is more valuable must be stipulated. This criterion can differ 
according to the type of good being evaluated. Thus, for example, an old slate works might 
have historical value to a community whilst being of little or no ecological value. A 
marshland might have little value as a landscape whilst being of great ecological value (ibid: 
107). It is, he argues, vacuous to say that the marshland is more valuable than the slate works, 
or vice versa, unless it is made clear who or what it is more valuable for. The concept of 
‘weak comparability’ avoids this non-attributive use of the term ‘value,’ while still allowing 
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for the possibility of making rational choices where decisions require consideration of 
multiple values.  
As O’Neill acknowledges, choices involving alternative courses of action, of the kind 
with which all schools of economics are concerned, inevitably involve conflicts between 
multiple, incommensurable value dimensions. Choices made only on the assumption of weak 
comparability must still involve consideration of the relative priority of the different values 
involved. Such decisions take the form of a comparison of alternatives that is ‘ordinal’ in the 
straightforward sense that, in the end, one alternative is chosen ahead of another, even though 
no single unit of valuation is assumed. That the values involved are only weakly comparable 
does not preclude the ‘ordinal’ comparison of alternatives in this sense. As noted above, the 
ordinal comparability of alternatives in this same sense, referred to by Mises as “the choices 
of individuals, their preferring of some things and setting aside of other things” (Mises 1949: 
201), underpins the Austrian theory of how exchange values emerge through the market 
process. Hence the Austrian case for markets is, like the methods of Ecological Economics, 
consistent with the assumption of weak comparability only. 
Since the work of Robbins in the early 1930s, neoclassical economic theory has 
moved away from the assumption of values being cardinally measurable and is also now 
founded upon the premise of ordinal choice. However, neoclassical-inspired CBA methods 
that seek to capture excluded values in monetary terms differ from Ecological Economics 
approaches by assuming that all decision criteria can be treated as compensatory. 
Compensatory criteria are those where a payment can compensate for their not being fulfilled 
and so an exchange value can be assigned to them. Ecological Economics, by contrast, 
emphasises the significance of non-compensatory values. Certain excluded values, including 
some environmental values, are held to be non-compensatory, meaning that there can be no 
compensation for failure to fulfil them. It follows that they cannot be captured in terms of an 
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exchange value. In an ordinal ranking of alternatives, those failing to satisfy non-
compensatory criteria will always be placed below those that do meet all such criteria, 
regardless of any compensation that may be offered (Lockwood 1996). This creates the 
possibility of a two-tier lexicographical ordering of preferences and represents an important 
conceptual break from the assumption of Neoclassical Economics that all preferences are 
substitutable (Spash 2000: 199-200). 
Ecological Economists emphasise the importance of non-compensatory criteria in 
their discussion of environmental sustainability. They are committed to a ‘strong’, as opposed 
to ‘weak’, version of sustainability. Weak sustainability, as Ekins puts it, derives “from a 
perception that welfare is not normally dependent on a specific form of capital and can be 
maintained by substituting manufactured for natural capital, though with exceptions” (Ekins 
2000: 76). Strong sustainability “derives from a different perception that substitutability of 
manufactured for natural capital is seriously limited by such environmental characteristics as 
irreversibility, uncertainty and the existence of ‘critical’ components of natural capital, which 
make a unique contribution to welfare” (ibid). As Ekins notes, the point at issue between 
these two views of sustainability is an empirical one concerning the extent to which 
ecological services are substitutable (ibid: 77). In addition to this empirical perspective, the 
ecological school stresses that the notion of compensation becomes entirely inapplicable, 
even meaningless, when ecological services are non-substitutable (Funtowitz and Ravetz 
1994; Vatn 2000: 504). Hence, generally speaking, there is scepticism in Ecological 
Economics about the applicability of the concept of compensation to environmental valuation 
(e.g. Martinez-Alier et al 1998). 
This scepticism might, however, be a reflection of the real world case studies that are 
usually considered in Ecological Economics. These tend to involve sustainability limits being 
(or are at high risk of being) violated, making the concept of compensability less applicable. 
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In cases where ecological services are substitutable and hence their depletion does not 
threaten sustainability, a relationship of indifference can be defined between varying levels of 
the ecological service and the manufactured substitute. In such cases, ecological services 
could be considered legitimate objects of market exchange. There is recognition of this point 
in Ecological Economics, where it is advocated that market exchange occurs within the 
context of a set of non-market institutions for ensuring that economic activity is sustainable. 
Hence Martinez-Alier et al refer to “the possibility of limiting the compensability among 
indicators” rather than rejecting the notion of compensability entirely (my emphasis, 
Martinez-Alier et al 1998: 284). 
Lockwood’s treatment of the concept of compensation is consistent with this 
approach. He considers the case of a person for whom certain threshold levels of 
consumption and environmental protection are essential and hence non-compensatory. For 
such a person, he points out, a “decision that involves choices between changes in personal 
well-being and nature conservation so that both remain at levels above their respective 
thresholds may attract compensatory preferences” (Lockwood 1996: 276). Crowards (1997: 
159-60) similarly outlines the possibility of allowing for trade-offs between resources within 
a framework of certain minimum standards of equity and sustainability. 
Just as there is scope for compensability in Ecological Economics, Austrian theory leaves 
room for recognition of its limits. Even though neither Mises nor Hayek discuss the possibility, 
nothing that they say rules out the possibility of excluded values being non-compensatory. It is in 
terms of their perception of the normative significance and empirical scale of problems excluded 
from consideration by the market, such as threats to environmental sustainability and social 
equity, that the ecological and Austrian schools differ. Concern about biophysical limits is absent 
from the Austrians and is even downplayed by modern day, Austrian-inspired ‘free market 
environmentalism’ (Greenwood 2007a: 82). The Austrians are also less concerned by the 
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inequality of wealth that arises from markets. For example, Hayek’s procedural theory of justice 
is entirely compatible with highly unequal outcomes. By contrast, the Green paradigm 
emphasises the significance of excluded values and is deeply concerned with the challenge of 
defining democratically accountable non-market institutions to establish non-compensatory 
limits to the scope of markets. Austrian Economics makes no attempt to address the question of 
how such non-market institutions might be designed. Nevertheless, Austrian theory, starting 
from a recognition of the incommensurability of values that it shares with Ecological 
Economics, raises some important challenges for these Green proposals, to which I turn next. 
 
3. Three Forms of Complexity 
Of central importance for assessing this Austrian challenge is the distinction used by Mises 
(1920) between the productive and distributive spheres of the economy. Production involves 
decisions concerning what to produce and how best to produce it. The distributive sphere of 
the economy involves the distribution of goods once they have been produced. For Mises, 
non-market production is the defining feature of socialism. Not only is it possible in principle 
for non-market planning of production to be combined with consumer goods markets but 
markets of this latter sort would, Mises seems to suggest (1920: 90-2), inevitably arise in a 
socialist economy. Mises’ argument against the feasibility of socialism thus focuses upon the 
problem of how to plan production in the absence of markets for factors of production 
(natural resources, labour and manufactured capital). He suggests that it is in this productive 
sphere of the economy where the complexity challenge that non-market planners would face 
is most profound. 
Three forms of complexity can be identified in Mises work: technical, economic and 
value complexity. Technical complexity consists of the productive coefficients involved in 
the vast number of different technologies. Such technical information can indeed, as Neurath 
points out, be expressed in terms of physical units of measurement. However adept socialist 
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planners might be at gathering technical information, they must still face the problem of 
economic complexity concerning how to allocate a finite supply of factors of production in 
order to most efficiently meet production objectives. This problem of economic calculation 
applies even when it is assumed that a target set of productive outputs for the economy has 
already been fixed (Mises 1920). It is one aspect of what Hayek refers to as the ‘coordination 
problem’ facing any society. In the face of economic complexity, Mises argues, market prices 
are indispensable as ‘aids to the mind’. This argument has gained widespread acceptance and 
the Green paradigm considers factor markets to be a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for 
achieving productive efficiency in the context of economic complexity, as defined here. 
The Austrian case for markets is far more contentious in relation to the, logically 
separable, problem of ‘value complexity’, and this is where Green theorists part company with 
the Austrians. The term ‘value complexity’ is not used by Mises or Hayek but the concept is 
ever-present in their writings. This third aspect of the complexity challenge arises with the need 
to define the objectives of production over time. Alternatives must be assessed in terms of the 
plurality of preferences, values, or ‘ends’ that motivate individuals in society. For the Austrians, 
just as production goods-markets are indispensable for addressing economic complexity, so are 
consumer goods-markets essential in the face of value complexity. Exchange values in consumer 
goods-markets perform the same functions of knowledge encapsulation and discovery as the 
prices generated by production goods-markets. In the Austrian view, non-market institutions 
cannot possibly acquire the information about consumer preferences contained in market prices, 
given the highly specific and changing nature of individual preferences. Furthermore, prices 
serve as a guide for consumers as they continually seek new, more effective ways of achieving 
their ends. Achieving coordination between production objectives and the preferences and 
values held by individuals across society is a further aspect of the coordination problem 
presented by Hayek. Coupled with a normative commitment to a certain conception of 
individual liberty, this challenge leads the Austrians to grant primacy to consumer preferences as 
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they are stated through the process of market exchange. They therefore support only the most 
minimal and consistently applied forms of welfare provision and intervention in the market.  
The Austrian commitment to ‘consumer sovereignty’ has been the subject of strong 
criticism from political philosophy in general (e.g. O’Neill 1998) and the Green paradigm in 
particular (e.g. Barry 1996: 122-5). There are strong ethical grounds for questioning whether 
primacy should always be granted to the stated preferences of consumers where they entail what 
might be viewed as undesirable consequences, about which the consumers concerned might not 
even be fully informed. The unsustainable use of ecological services is an important example of 
such a consequence. While consumer goods markets still have an important role in the Green 
model of political economy, the aim is for non-market institutions to establish production 
objectives to shape and sometimes counteract the signals that emerge from these consumer 
goods-markets. 
The Green critique of consumer sovereignty is far from being a denial of value 
pluralism, that it takes to be an inevitable feature of modern society. While the democratic 
processes favoured by many Greens might establish a degree of consensus in relation to 
certain non-market objectives, it is appreciated that opinions will inevitably, to some degree, 
conflict. So, for example, the task of defining environmental sustainability involves value 
dimensions relating to the standard of living, time preference and the moral claims of future 
generations. Definition and implementation of the concept is recognised to be normatively 
contestable and hence a political issue (Barry 1996: 119). 
On the Green model, non-market forms of decision-making must therefore assess a 
complex space of economic alternatives in terms of the plurality of values held by individuals 
across society. This challenge of value complexity is somewhat analogous to that of 
economic complexity in that it involves decisions between different possible means for 
achieving certain ends. The challenge of value complexity could be said to be even more 
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profound, given that the ‘ends’ concerned are human ends that are far less tangible than the 
quantitatively definable ends of economic calculation. 
Hayek raises the important question of how, in the face of value complexity, 
democratic, non-market institutions can achieve this task in a coordinated way. Although the 
ecological tradition shares with Austrian Economics a recognition of the importance of local 
knowledge (O’Neill 2004: 434), it is generally accepted that such non-market coordination 
cannot be achieved through localised decision-making alone. Decisions concerning certain 
resources need to be made across larger geographical scales. As Pennington puts it, “(if) 
complex inter-community relations are not to be coordinated through impersonal market 
forces then at some point recourse must be made to some central “‘coordinating’ authority” 
(Pennington 2001: 179). While the need for some larger scale, including global, decisions is 
acknowledged by some Green theorists (Dobson 1990: 184; Jacobs 1991: 131; Barry 1999: 
118), the question remains of how to coordinate non-market decisions across multiple 
geographical scales. Pennington (2001) argues, from an Austrian perspective, that discursive 
processes alone are insufficient for adequately addressing such complex decisions. Certainly 
it seems that, where market prices fail to provide adequate guidance, non-market institutions 
require some kind of alternative ‘aids to the mind’ that enable decision-makers to address the 
coordination problem.v 
 
4. Multiple criteria evaluation 
Multiple Criteria Analysis (MCA) is a set of analytical methods for assessing policy 
alternatives in terms of a plurality of incommensurable values. While MCA methods do 
involve a formal analysis of a problem, certain MCA approaches are designed to facilitate 
public involvement and transparency in the decision-making process, enabling participants to 
explore the various dimensions of complex decisions (Munda 2004; Rauschmayer and 
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Wittmer 2006). Whereas the CBA approach typically proceeds by seeking to establish and 
then aggregate individual valuations (O’Neill and Spash 2000), MCA, by contrast, can enable 
participants to develop and revise their views through a dialogical process. No set of property 
entitlements to the resources concerned need be assumed by MCA. This is in contrast to CBA 
approaches which presuppose a certain set of property entitlements to the resources being 
valued that can influence these individual valuations (ibid). Another advantage of MCA is 
that it offers numerous techniques for assisting where information is missing or uncertain, as 
is the case in so many environmental problems (Munda 1994: 102). 
The potential role of MCA in addressing the coordination problem highlighted by the 
Austrians has so far been the subject of relatively little discussion.vi Yet there have been 
innumerable MCA case studies in environmental planning, albeit primarily on a local scale, 
where MCA is viewed as a means of “operationalising” different conceptions of 
sustainability (Martinez-Alier et al 1998: 283-5). There is a need to make explicit the 
potential role of MCA as a means of enabling the problem of non-market coordination to be 
addressed. 
When multiple criteria methods emerged in the 1970s, they tended to be used by 
small groups or committees, with the wider public having little or no opportunity for direct 
involvement in the decision-making process. This ‘committee-based’ use of MCA clearly 
does not answer the Austrian question of how non-market decision-making can reflect the 
range of values held across society in the way that they say is facilitated by markets. 
However, there is now a growing recognition that MCA processes can have an important role 
within the context of participatory democratic institutions (Banville et al 1998; Lahdelma et 
al 2000; Munda 2004, 2005; Rauschmayer and Wittmer 2006; Stagl 2006). 
There have so far been relatively few studies exploring the application of MCA to 
more complex problems involving ‘inter-community coordination’ of the kind that 
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Pennington suggests are especially problematic for non-market institutions. Yet the challenge 
of defining the coordinative role of non-market institutions in the Green paradigm demands 
that the potential scalability of MCA processes be explored. Refraining from addressing this 
question would leave Ecological Economics vulnerable to the charge, already made by 
Özkaynak et al (2004: 294-6), that it accepts and intends only to complement the current 
scope of the present day capitalist market economy. 
The Austrian presentation of the coordination problem can serve as a framework for 
evaluating different MCA methods. Vincke (1992) suggests that the numerous different 
varieties of MCA can be classified into three main types: multi-attribute utility theory 
(MAUT), outranking techniques and interactive methods. Some techniques might be hybrids 
of these three kinds of method and the purpose here is not to establish a definitive 
recommendation of any particular set of techniques. Instead, the aim is to explore some of the 
key theoretical underpinnings of each generally defined approach, in order to assess the 
coordinative potential of MCA processes. How, it is asked, does each approach establish 
‘aids to the mind’ for navigating complex decisions involving multiple incommensurable 
criteria? Addressing this theoretical question is a necessary first step before the broader 
institutional context of MCA processes can be considered. 
In general, the different MCA methods each involve the following essential stages, 
although the order in which they are conducted can vary.vii 
(i) Define problem  
(ii) Define alternatives 
(iii) Define criteria 
(iv) Assess performance of alternatives in terms of individual criteria 
(v) Determine the priority of criteria 
(vi) Compare alternatives across all criteria 
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(vii) Drawing of conclusions 
As part of stage iii, it is possible to hierarchically structure the criteria in order to simplify the 
task of evaluating alternatives. ‘Primary’ and ‘means’ criteria can be distinguished. Primary 
criteria are those things that decision makers “fundamentally care about”, while means 
objectives “matter only through their effect on these fundamental concerns” (Gregory and 
Keeney 1994). Although there remains a need to establish the relative importance of the 
different means objectives within each primary criterion this method offers a way of breaking 
down the evaluation process into a number of discrete, less complex decisions (see, for 
example, Gregory and Keeney 1994). 
Some recent MCA case studies have explored how participatory processes can be 
designed for each of these stages (e.g. Gregory and Keeney 1994, De Marchi et al 2000; 
Mendoza and Prabhu 2003; Stagl 2006). Rather than having to stop once stage vii is reached, 
MCA can be an open-ended process in which stages i-vi can be revisited in light of the 
conclusions reached. The discussion below focuses upon stages iv – vi, although for 
interactive methods (discussed in section 4.3 below) the process of defining alternatives 
(stage ii above) occurs at a later stage in the MCA process and is also discussed. For the 
purposes of this conceptual discussion, the term ‘decision-makers’ is used to refer to a set of 
people whose preferences are being incorporated into the MCA process. The actual number 
of people to be included in this set is left unspecified. 
 
4.1 Multi-Attribute Utility Theory 
The most long-established set of MCA methods is MAUT. This is based upon a set of 
assumptions of which both Austrian and Ecological Economics are strongly critical. MAUT 
methods seek to define utility functions that express the decision makers’ evaluation of each 
criterion. The utility scores of each alternative on each of the criteria are then aggregated. 
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One of the most commonly used aggregation methods is the general additive model, which 
takes the following form: 
                       n 
   Uj = Σui [gij] 
                     i=1    Vatn (2005: 345) 
where Uj is the utility of alternative j, ui  is a utility function which is a non-decreasing 
function of the scores gij on criterion i on alternative j. One popular version of the additive 
model is the ‘weighted summation’ model, which is as follows:         
                n 
   Uj = Σwi . pij 
                     i=1    (ibid) 
where wi is the non-negative weight assigned to each criterion to indicate its relative 
importance and i and pij is the standardised, or ‘normalised’ score on each criterion.viii  
Ecological and Austrian theory provide strong grounds for criticism of some of the 
core assumptions of MAUT models. Firstly, an assumption of the weighted sum model 
(though not the additive model in general) is that the utility functions for each criterion are 
linear (Bouyssou et al 2000: 106-7). Yet, in the case of many economic decisions, the 
relationships between the preferences for variables are often non-linear. For certain criteria, 
there might even be a non-compensatory minimum standard (see section 2), hence the 
assumption of the compensability of criteria can also be challenged from an ecological 
perspective. It should be noted, however, that non-compensatory minimum standards can be 
incorporated into MAUT methods and even interpreted in terms of utility theory (Nijkamp 
and Rietveld 1990: 54). 
A variety of ‘direct’ techniques have been developed that seek to separately establish 
a utility function for each individual criterion (Vincke 1992: 44-7). Some of these techniques 
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assume that criteria can be evaluated in terms of cardinal utility, seeking to base valuations 
upon the relative intensity of preferences. All of these direct techniques assume the 
preferential independence of criteria.ix As O’Neill puts it, this assumption is that “each value 
can be treated like a discrete item on a list, its contribution to the final appraisal of a 
particular item’s worth being separable from that of others” (O’Neill 1993: 114). Challenging 
this assumption, O’Neill makes the distinctively Hayekian point that the value of criteria 
cannot be pre-specified in abstract terms, independently of context (ibid). Instead, as Hayek 
stressed, effective decision-making involves a process of discovering the inter-relationships 
between the variables that particular, concrete alternatives involve (Hayek 1978: 143). 
Decision makers’ values can change once their implications are made apparent in terms of 
concretely defined outcomes, as numerous MCA case studies have shown (e.g. Keeney et al 
1990). 
In the light of such epistemological considerations ‘indirect’ techniques of criteria 
evaluation have been developed. These involve inferring utility functions from decision 
makers’ ordinal choices between concrete policy options, rather than requiring a grading of 
the relative importance of each criterion in isolation (Nijkamp and Rietveld 1990: 49-51; 
Vincke 1992: 47-8). This means that the comparison of alternatives (stage vi) precedes the 
determination of the relative priority of criteria (stage v). The indirect approach is more 
sensitive to the inter-relationships between criteria in the particular decision context, although 
this in turn gives cause for questioning how far the resultant utility functions are applicable to 
decisions made in different contexts. 
Assessing the MAUT approach in general, there are echoes of the Austrian 
perspective in Roy’s important observation that: 
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“(An actor’s) preferences may not be completely formulated, may exhibit internal 
conflicts, and may not be stable. These characteristics may result from a lack of 
information, different interpretations of a value system, or divergent value systems” 
(Roy 1996, 77). 
This insight into the further epistemological problems that arise in multiple criteria decisions 
highlights the need for a procedure that is transparent and hence enables decision-makers to 
clarify and further understand the inter-relationships between their values and the decision 
criteria. As highlighted by Austrian theory, facilitating such a discovery process is crucial for 
addressing value complexity. In comparison to other MCA approaches, it is more difficult to 
comprehend how the results of MAUT arise from the information provided by the decision 
maker. This lack of transparency can restrict the extent to which MAUT facilitates the 
discovery of new, alternative solutions. 
Furthermore, in order that complete utility functions can be defined, MAUT 
approaches require decision-makers to answer a large number of questions covering the full 
range of possible values for each variable. As practitioners of MAUT methods recognise, this 
can be a highly costly and time-consuming process (Keeney et al 1990). As Vincke points 
out, such an approach becomes wasteful when many of the questions involve trade-offs 
between inferior alternatives (Vincke 1992: 57). Hence, while promising increased precision, 
MAUT techniques can be both costly and lacking transparency. This, along with the scope 
for challenging some of the assumptions of MAUT approaches, has led many practitioners to 
adopt alternative kinds of MCA method. 
 
4.2 Outranking methods 
The suitability of a second set of MCA techniques for addressing the coordination problem, 
known as ‘outranking methods,’ can be questioned for different reasons. In contrast to 
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MAUT, outranking methods are specifically designed to avoid the assumption of 
compensatory criteria. Instead, ‘outranking relations’ between alternatives are established. 
These relations are based upon a series of ordinal rankings of alternatives according to each 
of the different criteria. An alternative a1 is said to dominate alternative a2 if a1 is preferred 
to a2 on at least one criterion and decision-makers are indifferent between them on any 
criterion where a1 is not preferred. All dominated alternatives are eliminated from the 
candidate set of solutions. To increase the scope for eliminating alternatives, thresholds can 
be defined to create a range of criteria scores between which decision makers are considered 
to be indifferent. 
Even when such thresholds are set, most problems will involve a choice between 
multiple, non-dominated alternatives. Those outranking methods that refrain from using 
numerical weightsx are of limited use for such problems, for they are not designed to capture 
variation in the relative importance of criteria. A simplifying assumption is sometimes made 
that all of the criteria are of equal weight but this will be unsuitable in many cases. There are 
certain kinds of problems for which the more open-ended nature of outranking methods could 
be viewed as a strength. After all, the primary purpose of MCA is to clarify the different 
dimensions of a problem (i.e. to serve as a decision aid) rather than to necessarily recommend 
a single, determinate solution. However, for some problems, the number of feasible 
alternatives is insufficiently reduced in the absence of criteria weights (Lahdelma et al 2000: 
602). 
As a further aid to decision-making in such cases, some outranking techniques, such as 
certain versions of the ELECTRE method, have been designed to incorporate criteria 
weightings. The sum of the weights of the criteria where an alternative a1 dominates a2 is 
compared to the sum of all weights to provide a ‘concordance index’. A ‘discordance index’ is 
also used to veto those alternatives where an alternative scores very badly on a particular 
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criterion.xi The weights used to establish these indices are, ‘coefficients of importance’ (Munda 
1996) indicating the relative importance of one criterion compared to another. They do not 
imply compensatory trade-offs between criteria in the sense that “an increased amount of the 
less-valued criterion can compensate for the loss related to the higher-valued one” (Vatn 2005: 
341). Such numerical weightings nevertheless express the relative priority of criteria in terms of a 
commensurable unit. In this regard, they serve as ‘aids to the mind’ whilst avoiding the 
assumption of compensability. A decision is still needed about the level at which to set the 
criteria weights. This decision could be made through either a direct or indirect method (see 
section 4.1 above) but either way this involves ordinal choices being made between different 
possible weightings and the different evaluative outcomes that they imply.  
 
4.3 Interactive methods 
The complex coordination problems facing non-market institutions, of the kind with which 
the Austrian pro-market thesis is particularly concerned, often involve trade-offs between 
continuous variables. This entails a choice between a theoretically infinite number of non-
dominated alternatives. For example, the problem of defining sustainability involves 
continuous variables such as ecological resource use and productive capacity. A third set of 
‘interactive’ approaches to MCA are especially suitable for exploring complex problems of 
this kind (Munda 1993: 44-5). 
Interactive methods have important similarities with the market process, as understood 
in Austrian theory. The value of criteria are not assumed as given but understood to emerge 
through a dialectical exploration of the inter-relationships between policy alternatives and ordinal 
preferences. Interactive methods also avoid the drawbacks arising from the requirement in 
MAUT to make a comprehensive set of pairwise comparisons across the full range of possible 
criterion scores. Instead, a trial and error search through the space of candidate solutions is 
undertaken. Starting with a given candidate solution, decision makers specify the criterion (c1) 
 22
with the least satisfactory value and the criterion on which they are willing to accept a reduced 
score (c2) in exchange for an increase in c1. On the basis of this information, a new candidate 
solution is then identified. This decision process involves addressing ‘trade-offs’ between criteria 
without attempting to specify indifference curves between them, and so avoids assuming 
compensability. Instead, the purpose of the trade-off is to identify a candidate solution that is 
ordinally preferred. Each stage of the interactive procedure creates a new constraint that narrows 
down the size of the solution space. This process of specifying preferences is repeated until a 
solution is reached that the decision maker finds satisfactory. Numerical weights in the sense of 
‘coefficients of importance’ (as described in section 4.2 above) can be inferred from the chosen 
solution. Some interactive methods allow for previously expressed preferences to be reversed. 
This allows for decision makers changing their mind when they discover the implications of their 
stated preferences.xii Interactive methods compare favourably to MAUT in enabling decision-
makers to focus their attention upon a smaller number of alternatives. Nevertheless, they are still 
time consuming and this means that they are only feasible for problems involving a small 
number of criteria (Nijkamp and Rietveld 1990: 52-3). 
 
4.4 Defining the ecological approach to MCA 
The criteria weights and/or outranking relations established by different MCA methods offer 
potential for facilitating the two functions of knowledge encapsulation and discovery that, 
according to the Austrians, can only be performed by markets. Crucially from an ecological 
perspective, in certain MCA methods this is achieved whilst avoiding the assumption of the 
compensability of all criteria across the full range of their possible scores. The concepts of 
commensurability and trade-offs are present in certain MCA approaches, such as interactive 
techniques, that avoid this assumption of ‘unlimited compensability’. In such MCA methods, 
commensurable, numerical weights (or ‘coefficients of importance’) for criteria emerge from 
a series of ordinal choices involving incommensurable criteria. In this respect the valuation 
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process is analogous to market price formation, as understood by Austrian theory. The 
ordinal choices concerning the definition and implementation of non-compensatory limits to 
the scope of markets can also be understood as involving ‘trade-offs’ in the sense, identified 
by Farber et al (2002: 377), of being choices between the different potential implications of 
each alternative. As indicators of the importance of criteria, such weights offer the potential 
for serving as ‘aids to the mind,’ enabling comparisons between the preferences of different 
decision makers and between the decisions made across different institutions and 
geographical scales. Such an approach makes MCA potentially scalable to more complex 
problems, as required in order to address the Austrian problem of non-market coordination. 
The suitability of different MCA techniques, such as those concerning the 
compensability of preferences and the extent to which criteria can be measured in 
quantitative terms, require careful consideration in each case. MCA methods range from 
MAUT based techniques where compensatory criteria are assumed (e.g. Keeney et al 1990; 
Gregory and Keeney 1994; Gregory et al 2001) to the approach used by De Marchi et al 
(2000) and Gamboa (2006) that is designed to incorporate uncertainty and non-compensatory 
criteria. As Stagl (2006) shows, ranking alternatives on each criterion even according to very 
simple ordinal schemas can serve as an important mechanism for facilitating understanding of 
certain policy issues. These different MCA approaches might each have a role in the context 
of Green political economy, where there can be room for recognition of compensatory criteria 
within the context of certain non-compensatory limits. 
Nobody suggests that MCA alone can achieve the broadening of participation that is 
favoured by the Green paradigm. Yet MCA processes could, for example, be used in 
combination with other institutional mechanisms, such as in the design and/ or evaluation of a 
set of policy alternatives before they are opened up to wider forms of democratic decision-
making. The study by De Marchi et al (2000) starts to explore such possibilities, using 
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findings from MCA to formulate a questionnaire designed to extend public involvement in 
the decision-making process. Experiments with MCA methods have so far been primarily on 
a relatively small scale. While, such studies provide an important first stage for addressing 
the challenge of coordination, further research is needed to assess the scalability of such 
approaches, both in terms of the numbers of participants and the geographical scale of the 
problems addressed. Only through such a discovery process can the force of the Austrian 
challenge to Ecological Economics be thoroughly assessed. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Mises and Hayek’s thesis, that the coordination problem is beyond the grasp of even the most 
well-intentioned politicians and planners, offers important insights for assessing non-market 
institutional processes such as MCA methods. Viewed from this Austrian perspective, MCA 
approaches face some significant epistemological challenges. These include the problem of 
eliciting decision makers’ preferences and of bridging the gap between the abstract modelling 
and the concrete reality of policy choices. Also, MCA methods tend to be labour intensive 
and are therefore less suitable for involving larger numbers of participants. 
Nevertheless, MCA methods have been shown to offer a structured yet dynamic 
approach to non-market decisions that involve multiple, incommensurable criteria. MCA 
offers ways of identifying the key value dimensions of a problem and exploring the 
implications of policy alternatives in terms of these values. Clarification of the conceptual 
underpinnings of the different MCA techniques, as demanded by the Austrian thesis, reveals 
that they can enable the functions of knowledge encapsulation and discovery to be fulfilled. 
Hence MCA methods offer significant cause for questioning Austrian scepticism about the 
coordinative capacity of non-market institutions. 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
i For example, see issues 3(4) and 9(4) of this journal where the critique is developed in a 
number of articles.  
 
ii Here, Schumpeter’s contribution is closely associated with the Austrian tradition. 
 
iii See Chang (1997) for the initial formulation of this definition. 
 
iv Mises’ critique first appears in his seminal 1920 paper ‘Economic Calculation in the 
Socialist Commonwealth.’ 
 
v Beckerman and Pasek (1997: 77-82) also discuss this problem.  
 
vi Although, note that O’Neill provides a comparison between MCA and the Austrian 
approach to environmental valuation (1998: 125-8). 
 
vii This list is an adapted version of that provided by Nijkamp and Rietveld (1990). 
 
viii Numerous standardisation techniques are available. One of the most commonly used is the 
following: 
 
     (gi – min gi) 
pi = _____________ 
 (max gi – min gi)   Nijkamp and Rietveld (1990: 42) 
 
ix Preferential independence means that preferences between alternatives that differ only 
according to a certain subset of criteria (I) are independent of their score on the criteria not in 
I (Ī) - Ī  is referred to as the complement of I (Vincke 1992: 37-8).  
 
x See, for example, the ELECTRE IV method devised by Bernard Roy (Vincke 1992: 68-9). 
 
xi Full details of this ELECTRE I method and some subsequent refinements of the technique 
are provided by Vincke (1992: 58-69). 
 
xii The procedure can be extended to include a sensitivity analysis for testing the robustness of 
a final decision in the face of uncertainty and potential change in criterion scores (Janssen 
1994). 
